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HI-VOLTAGE WIRE WORKS, INC. V. CITY OF SAN JOSE
12 P.3D 1068 (CAL. 2000)

FACTS
In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 209, thereby amending
their constitution to prohibit governmental entities from "discriminat[ing]
against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting."'
Prior to the
constitutional amendment, the City of San Jose (the "City") required private
contractors to make "reasonable efforts" to hire minorities in order for the
contractor to be considered for government contracts.' The City focused on
increasing the participation of Minority Business Enterprises ("MBEs") and
Women Business Enterprises ("WBEs") in public works projects.3 The City
would set participation goals based on the number of available, qualified
MBEs and WBEs and award its construction contracts to the lowest
"responsible bidder" - the contractor who had met or exceeded these goals
or had made and documented its reasonable efforts to attain the City's goal."
After the constitution was amended the City implemented measures for a
new program, the "Nondiscrimination/Nonpreferential Treatment Program
Applicable to Construction Contracts in Excess of $50,000" (the "Program"). 5
The goal of the Program was to eliminate the ongoing discrimination against
women and minorities that the City had continued to find in public
construction contracting.6 The City structured the Program to require its
potential prime contractors to demonstrate that they did not discriminate
against any MBE or WBE subcontractors.7 In order to be considered for a city
construction contract, a contractor had to show that it complied with either the
"Documentation of Outreach" or the "Documentation of Participation"
requirement of the Program.8 If a contractor failed to make a showing that it
had fulfilled one of these two options in the hiring of subcontractors, the City
would reject its bid.9
Under the "Documentation of Outreach" option, a contractor had to
provide written documentation that it had taken certain specifiedsteps to seek
1. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 31.
2. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 72 Cal. App. 4th 600, 603 (1999).

3. Id. at 603 (defining MBEs and WBEs as businesses in which at least 51% of business is owned
and controlled by one or more minority persons or women).

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 603.
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 605.
Id.

8.

id.

9. Id. at 606.
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MBE or WBE subcontractors.' First, the contractor was required to send
written notice to four certified MBE or WBE subcontracting firms for each
trade area of a project." Then the contractor was required to contact, or
document at least three attempts to contact, the MBE or WBE businesses in
order to gauge their interest in the project.' 2 Finally, the contractor had an
affirmative duty to negotiate in good faith with interested MBE or WBE
businesses, and was required to specify reasons for rejecting a MBE or WBE
business's bid.' 3
The "Documentation of Participation" option created an "evidentiary
presumption" that discrimination did not occur throughout the bidding
process. 4 The contractor could invoke the presumption that discrimination
had not occurred if his or her bid included at least the same percentage of
WBE or MBE businesses that a nondiscriminatory bid would include, based
on a percentage that was calculated by the City.' 5 The City determined the
minimum number of WBE or MBE businesses that should be included in each
project by calculating a ratio of the available MBEs and WBEs to the total
potential opportunities per project."
A contractor that satisfied the
Documentation of Participation option did not have to satisfy the
Documentation of Outreach option and vice versa.
Allen Jones and Hi-Voltage Wire Works ("Hi-Voltage"), respectively, a
city taxpayer and a general contracting firm, sued the City asserting that the
Program was discriminatory and therefore in violation of article I, section 31
of the California Constitution. 7 In 1997, Hi-Voltage had placed the lowest bid
for a public works project but was rejected because it failed to satisfy either of
the outreach or participation components of the City's Program.' 8 Both
plaintiffs claimed that the Program forced contractors to unlawfully prefer
MBE and WBE businesses by giving them "special assistance and
information" that other subcontractors did not receive. 9 The City and the
plaintiffs both moved for summary judgment.
The Superior Court ruled that the Program violated article I, section 31 and
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 20 The Court of Appeals
10. Id. at 605.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 606.
Id.

17.

Id.

18. Id. (noting that Hi-Voltage failed to meet requirements of Program because it intended to use
its own subcontractors for project).
19. id.
20. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Cal. 2000).
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affirmed the lower court's ruling, finding that the City's outreach option of the
program granted special treatment to minority- and women-owned businesses
that other businesses were not given. 2' In addition, it found that the
participation option, which the City argued was intended only as a "screening
process" for discrimination, was nonetheless discriminatory. 2 The Court of
Appeals held that the effects of the participation option led to preferential
treatment; thus, the City's lack of intent to discriminate was irrelevant.'
Therefore, the court enjoined the City from implementing the Program. The
Supreme Court of California granted the City's petition of review. 24
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the California Court of
Appeals' ruling that the Program violated article I, section 31 of the California
Constitution.25 The court held that the Program was unconstitutional because
it required, or at least encouraged, contractors to give preferential treatment to
subcontractors on the basis of race or gender as proscribed by article I, section
31 of the California Constitution. 6
ANALYSIS
Although all seven justices of the California Supreme Court agreed that
the City's program violated article I, section 31, they did not all join the
majority opinion. Justice Brown, who wrote the opinion for the court, found
it necessary to look at the long history of equal protection jurisprudence before
reaching the issue of the Program's constitutionality. Justice Mosk concurred
with the opinion, but felt it was necessary to also discuss ways in which the
City's Program could be changed to comport with the terms of the
amendment. 27 Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment but did not join the
majority opinion because he believed the issue could be resolved simply by
referring to the plain meaning of the constitutional text and by reviewing the
ballot materials.28 Chief Justice George concurred in the judgment but did not
join the majority opinion.29 He argued in his dissent that the court's role is to
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1072.
12 P.3dat 1072.
ld.at 1072.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id. at 1091-92 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Id. at 1092 (Kennard, J., concurring).
ld. at 1092-93 (George, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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"interpret and apply the language of the new state constitutional provision so
as to effectuate the intent of the voters who adopted the measure."30 He
believed there was no reason for the court to review past judicial opinions or
to consider the validity of affirmative action programs in general.3 1
The majority opinion first studied the path the United States Supreme
Court has taken in shifting from a strict standard of nondiscrimination to a
standard that permits race or sex-conscious classifications. In Brown v. Board
of Education,32 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the doctrine of
"separate but equal" in public education violated a person's Equal Protection
rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 Following the Brown
decision, the Court began to apply a strict standard that found any racial
discrimination endorsed by the government to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. 34 Despite these decisions that were in
35
keeping with Justice Harlan's view of a "color-blind" government,
discrimination remained a reality in America. 36 To combat this ongoing
discrimination, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 37
Title VII of the Civil Right Act ('Title VII") established that
discrimination by an employer based on an employee's race, color, sex, or
national origin is unlawful. 3 Because the language and purpose of article I,
section 31 of the California Constitution closely mirrored that of Title VII, the
court examined the historical judicial interpretation of Title VII.39 Following
Title VII's enactment, the Supreme Court held that the objective of the Civil

30. Id. at 1093 (George, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
31. Id. at 1093-94 (George, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Id. at 495.
34. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1073-74. See Peterson v. Greenville. 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (holding that
when state passes law that requires segregation, it violates of Fourteenth Amendment); Loving v. Virginia.
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding state ban on interracial marriages unconstitutional). Even before the Brown
decision, the Court had already begun to develop a staunch antidiscrimination standard in its jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior CL of California, 339 U.S. 460, 463 (1950) (holding that injunction that

proscribed demonstration by picketers who were seeking to force the hiring of certain number of AfricanAmerican employees at grocery store in proportion to the number of African-American customers was not
violation of the picketers' free speech rights, reasoning that to allow demonstration would "give
constitutional protection to petitioner's efforts to subject opportunity of getting job to quota system");
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (declaring state court's enforcement of discriminatory restrictive

covenant unconstitutional).
35. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1073 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,

dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.")).
36. Id. at 1075.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).

38. Title VII states, in part, "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
39. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1075-79.
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Rights Act was to achieve absolute equality in employment' for all
individuals, not just minorities. 4 The Court stated that Title VII imposes no
"duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority
' In essence, the Court's
employees."42
application of Title VII reaffirmed
Congress' intent that the government act as a color-blind entity.43
The Supreme Court of California noted, however, that the Supreme
Court's decision in Steelworkers v. Weber' substantially changed the scheme
of Title VII jurisprudence. 5 In Weber, the Court held that an abolition of all
affirmative action would be contrary to the intent of Title VII." The Court
reasoned that because Congress' intent in enacting the Civil Rights Act was to
remedy pervasive discrimination against African-Americans, to ban all
voluntary or private affirmative action programs that sought to remedy such
discrimination would be contrary to that intent.4 7 In addition, Justice
Blackmun's concurrence noted that Title VII permits racial classifications in
jobs that are "traditionally segregated."" The Weber decision was a radical
departure from the Court's
previous decisions that compelled color-blind
49
treatment under Title VII.
Following the Weber decision, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile
its support of race-conscious action with its prior color-blind jurisprudence.50
In Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,51 the Court held that Title VII does not
prohibit affirmative action programs established to remedy past
discrimination.52 In reaching this decision, a plurality of the Court articulated
that Title VII could serve to "guarantee equal employment opportunities but

40. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (holding that Congress's intent in
enacting Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities," and finding that "[d]iscriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority" was proscribed).
41. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) (finding that "[Title
Vil's] terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race").
42. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1076 (quoting Furmco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78
(1978)).
43. Id. at 1076.
44. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
45. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1076 (citing Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
46. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-02.
47. id. at 202-03.
48. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1077-78. See Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that Court's majority opinion was contrary to settled law, as well as legislative history that had
established that Civil Rights Act forbade discrimination against any individual); Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 218
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976))
(finding that majority opinion was contrary to precedent that held Title VII "prohibits all racial
discrimination in employment, without exception for any group of particular employees").
50. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1078.
51. Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
52. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421,445 (1986).
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to 'foster' them as well. '5 3 The Court in Sheet Metal Workers noted that even
when an employer "formally ceases to engage in discrimination," informal
discrimination or the employer's reputation might serve as a deterrent for
minority applicants.54 In situations such as these, the court found that
"affirmative race-conscious relief may be the only means available to 'assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments
to the disadvantage of minority citizens.' 55 A year later, in Johnson v.
TransportationAgency,56 the Court held that a public agency that did not have
a prior history of sex discrimination was nonetheless justified in promoting a
woman over a man who ranked higher for a promotion because there existed
57
a "conspicuous... imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.
The majority opinion in Hi-Voltage recognized that the California courts
had paralleled the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which
changed the law "from protection of equal opportunity for all individuals to
entitlement based on group representation." 8 In Hughes v. Superior Court,59
later reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. Superior
Court of California,' the California court upheld a judgment of contempt
against picketers whose primary objective was to induce the hiring of AfricanAmerican clerks at a grocery store.6 ' In Hughes, the court condemned the
protesters' objective, which was to compel discriminatory hiring of one race
over another, rather than to dispel discrimination.6 2 In Bakke v. Regents of
University of California(Bakke /),63 the California court refused to uphold a
program that reserved a specific number of admission slots for minority
students. 64 Although the court recognized that such a quota system had the
laudable purpose of remedying past discrimination, it concluded that
"sanction[ing] racial discrimination against a race-any race-is a dangerous
concept fraught with potential for misuse in situations which involve far less
53. Id. at 448.
54. Id. at 449.
55. Id. at 449-50.
56. Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
57. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.
58. Hi-Voltage, 12 F.3d at 1079.
59. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850 (1948).
60. Hughes v. Superior Ct. of CaL, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
61. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d at 854.
62. Id. at 856.
63. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34 (1976) (Bakke 1). Later, in its plurality opinion,
the United States Supreme Court in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(Bakke IM, affirmed the California court's ruling that the admissions program was illegal and that the
applicant should be admitted to the school, but reversed the court's judgment that enjoined the medical
school from "according any consideration to race in its admissions process." id. (emphasis added).
64. Bakke 1, 18 Cal. 3dat61-62.
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laudable objectives than are manifest in the present case. 65 The court found
that the admissions program denied equal protection."
Following the Weber decision in 1979, California, like the Supreme Court,
shifted from no tolerance of any form of discrimination to an allowance of
some affirmative action programs.6 7 Rather than taking a "color-blind"
approach to employment programs, the California court upheld race-conscious
programs that were intended to remedy past discrimination.6" For instance, in
Price v. Civil Service Commission of Sacramento County,6 9 the court
permitted a race-conscious hiring program that required preferential treatment
of minorities because the program was intended to remedy past acts of
discrimination. 7 Dissenting in the Price opinion, Judge Mosk characterized
the majority's decision as "purport[ing] to eliminate discrimination by means
of creating discrimination; they construe equality of all persons regardless of
race to mean preference for persons of some races over others; and a hiring
program which compels compliance by a reluctant [county agency] is
described as voluntary."'" A year later, in DeRonde v. Regents of University
of California,72 the court held that considering race as a qualifying factor in a
law school admissions program was not unconstitutional. 73 The Hi-Voltage
court acknowledged that these decisions represented a "shift from a staunch
antidiscrimination jurisprudence to approval, sometimes endorsement, of
remedial race- and sex-conscious governmental decisionmaking." '74
The Hi-Voltage majority opinion then applied this history as background
to determine whether the City's MBE/WBE program violated article I, section
31 of the California Constitution. 75 The sole question the court considered was
whether the Program required preferential treatment or discrimination as
prohibited by article I, section 31.76 In considering this question, the court
of the amendment, interpreting it in its "natural" and
analyzed the language
"ordinary" sense. 77

65. Id. at 61-62.
66. Id.
67. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1080.
68. Id. at 1080-81.
69. Price v. Civil Serv. Cormn'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257 (1980).
70. Price,26 Cal. 3d 257, 270 (1980).
71. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1081 (quoting Price,26 Cal. 3d 257, 287 (Mosk, J., dissenting)).
72. DeRonde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. 3d 875 (1981).
73. DeRonde, 28 Cal. 3d 875, 890 (1981).
74. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1081.
75. Id. at 1082.
76. id. at 1081.
77. Id. at 1082 (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 245 (1978); People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 4th 294, 302 (1997)).
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In interpreting section 31, the court found no evidence in the language of
the amendment or in the ballot materials to indicate that the intent of the voters
was contrary to the plain meaning of the terms used.7" The court consulted a
dictionary to determine the plain meaning of the terms and found
"discriminate" to be defined as "to make distinctions in treatment; show
partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against)," and "preferential treatment" to
mean "giving 'preference,' which is 'a giving of priority or advantage to one
person ... over others."' 79 The court concluded, as the Court of Appeals held,
that the City's outreach option of the program gave preferential treatment to
MBE and WBE subcontractors and that the participation option discriminated
against non-MBE/WBE businesses.'s
The court then tested its interpretation of the text against the ballot
materials, which bore on the voters' intent and placed Proposition 209 in a
historical setting.8" The argument in favor of the amendment suggested that
in voting for the amendment, Californians would reinstate the strict nondiscrimination standards that the courts had followed in pre-Weber decisions.82
The court agreed with the district court's interpretation of the ballot materials
in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson (Coalition I),83 in which it
determined that "the people of California meant to do something more than
simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209." 84 In fact, the
ballot materials made it clear that Proposition 209 was intended to reinstate a
"color-blind" government, in which there would be "zero tolerance for
discrimination against---or for-any individual." 5 The majority therefore
concluded that the California voters intended to change the nature of their
public programs and to remove all evidence of discrimination when they
amended their constitution.'
The court concluded that both the outreach and participation components
of the Program were unconstitutional.8 7 It found that the outreach component
required contractors to give preferential treatment to MBEs andWBEs, which
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting WEBs'rER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY at 392, 1062 (3d college ed. 1988).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Powers v. City of Richmond, 10 Cal. 4th 85,93 (1995)). The ballot materials include
the Attorney General's summary arguments and the legislative analyst's comments. The courts assumed
that these ballot materials assisted the voters in approving the amendment, and should therefore be examined
to determine the voters' intent. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 72 Cal. App. 4th 600, 612,
n.12.
82. Id. at 1082-1083.
83. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D.Cal. 1996) (Coalition I).
84. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1083 (quoting Coalition 1, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (N.D.Cal 1996)).
85. Id. at 1083 (quoting Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) argument in favor of prop. 209, p.
32).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1083-1084.

2001]

Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose

clearly violated the prohibition against preferential treatment in section 3108
The court also concluded that the participation component was discriminatory
because it encouraged contractors to meet "race- and sex-conscious numerical
goals."8 9 The court found that the participation option was similar to a policy
that sets discriminatory quotas or set-asides. ° Therefore, the participation
option encouraged discrimination against non-MBE/WBEs. 91
The court stressed that the Program put a burden on the contractor to make
a showing that he or she did not discriminate, even though there was no prima
facie evidence of past discrimination. 92 The court found that this aspect of the
Program was completely contrary to the burden-shifting analysis used in
discrimination claims under Title VII.93 In such claims, a plaintiff carries the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 94 If the
plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the employer's actions. 9 If the employer can
articulate such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the employer's reason is simply a pretext for discrimination." The
Program, however, placed the burden on the contractors to prove
nondiscrimination, and this could only be accomplished by satisfying one of
the Program's two options. Because the court had already concluded that
these options were discriminatory, it found the only way for a contractor to
"prove it does not discriminate against minorities and women [is] by
' 97
discriminating or granting preferences in their favor.
The majority concluded that a program that grants special treatment to
some groups based on race or sex and not to others is exactly what the voters
sought to prohibit when they voted for Proposition 209.9' However,
recognizing that some outreach programs may be lawful, the majority limited
its holding to outreach programs that require prime contractors to "notify,

88. Id.at 1084.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1084 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
91. Id.
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id.at1076 n.7 (citing McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
95. Id.(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
96. Id.
97. ld.at 1085. In addition, the court went on to point out that the evidentiary presumption that the
contractor must show when choosing the participation option is contrary to the principles of the Civil Rights
Act. Title VII gives no protection to an employer that has a racially proportionate workforce; rather, the
purpose of Title VII is to ensure that every applicant has an equal opportunity for a job opening, regardless
of his or her race. Id. (citing Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978)).
98. Id.
at 1085.
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solicit, and negotiate with MBE/WBE subcontractors as well as justify
rejection of their bids." 99
In its defense, the City put forth several arguments to support the
constitutionality of the Program. The court, however, rejected these
arguments. For example, the City argued that its specific outreach program
was outside the scope section 31. The City argued that Lungren v. Superior
Court"° established that "targeted" or "focused" outreach programs are outside
of the scope of section 31.11 In Lungren, the Court of Appeals held that voters
were not misled to believe that the amendment would keep affirmative action
programs intact when the term affirmative action was not used in the ballot
materials. 0 2 The Lungren court stated that use of the term "affirmative action"
in the ballot materials would have been overinclusive because "most
definitions of the term would include not only the conduct which Proposition
209 would ban, i.e., discrimination and preferential treatment, but also other
03
efforts such as outreach programs."'
The City claimed that from this remark in the Lungren opinion, California
voters were misled to believe that outreach programs would remain intact
under Proposition 209.10 The majority rejected this argument and considered
the Lungren court's opinion to be overly broad. 0 5 The Lungren court was not
considering whether the City's Program was constitutional, or the meaning of
the terms "preferential treatment" or "discriminates" as applied to the Program,
and therefore, the majority was not compelled to incorporate the dicta in the
Lungren opinion in its interpretation of article 31. 10
The City asserted that voters were misled to believe that "targeted"
outreach programs would remain intact despite the amendment, because the
ballot argument in favor of Proposition 209 failed to mention that such
outreach programs would be unconstitutional. 7 However, the majority did
not construe the ballot materials as an exhaustive list of which programs would
be impermissible under Proposition 209.08 Rather, the majority read the ballot
materials as a general statement that any program that discriminated would be
prohibited, and any program that did not discriminate would be legal."°

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1086.
Lungren v. Superior Ct., 48 Cal. App. 4th 435 (1996).
Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1086.
Lungren, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 442.
Id.
Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1086.
12 P.3d at1086.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In addition, the City argued that "focused" outreach did not constitute a
preference under the current construction of Title VII and the equal protection
clause." 0 However, the majority pointed out that the ballot materials stress
that the initiative focused on "restat[ing] the historic Civil Rights Act."''. As
the majority opinion previously explained, the historic Civil Rights Act sought
to protect all persons from discrimination and ensure equal protection for all. " 2
By 1996, the judicial interpretation of the Civil Rights Act and the equal
protection clause had evolved into statutes that permitted programs that
afforded preferential treatment to some groups of individuals who had suffered
from past discrimination." 3 Just as the court in Coalition 1 had stated that
California voters intended "something more," the majority opinion construed
Proposition 209 to be a repudiation of the current construction of Title VII and
the equal protection clause, and a reversion
to the historical construction that
4
required equal treatment for all persons."
According to the City, the outreach option of the Program was a valid
method to increase the number of qualified subcontractors for bidding because
it did not use race as a factor to set participation goals, quotas, or good faith
efforts. 5 The court rejected this argument, stating that the City should not
have assumed that a program would be automatically race-neutral simply
because it was designated an outreach program." 6 If the outreach program
discriminates against a certain individual based on race or gender, then it is
unconstitutional." 7 In this case, the court concluded that the outreach option
required preferential treatment to some businesses and not others and was
therefore unconstitutional." 8
The City also asserted that some race-conscious programs are permitted
under equal protection. "' The majority pointed out, however, that whether the
Program passes equal protection standards was irrelevant." 2 The court noted
that article I, section 31 sets a higher standard than that of equal protection,
allowing for no "compelling state interest" exception.12 ' Therefore, the proper
analysis is not whether the Program meets the minimum standards of equal
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
1996)).
115.
116.

Id.

117.

Id.

Id.(quoting Ballot Pamphlet, argument in favor of Prop. 209, p.32).
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 1086-87 (quoting Coalition for Econ. Equal. v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480,1489 (N.D. Cal.
ld. at 1087.
Id.

118. Id.
119.

Id.

120. Id.
121. Id.
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protection, but rather whether the Program
is permissible under article I,
22
section 31 of the California Constitution.
The City also contended that it was obligated under federal law to
eradicate any past discrimination in subcontractor hiring that it found in its
disparity study. 2 a This argument failed for several reasons. First, the court
established that the United States Supreme Court has never held that "societal
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification."' 24 The only
duty of the City, therefore, is the "affirmative duty to desegregate."'' 25 When
a state or government entity has intentionally discriminated, race-conscious
programs are the only likely remedies for such discrimination. 26 While the
City's disparity study for the hiring of MBE and WBE subcontractors revealed
discrimination, the court noted that the study did not show that the City
intentionally discriminated.'27
Second, the City's argument that it had a federal duty to eradicate
discrimination failed because it confused what is permissible under the
Constitution with what is obligatory."n The Fourteenth Amendment permits
some race-conscious programs in certain circumstances but does not require
them. 29 The court noted that "the mere fact that affirmative action is
permissible under the [federal] regulations, and some judicial interpretation,
does not require preemption of a state law that prohibits affirmative action."3'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's analysis
regarding its application of article I, section 31 of the California Constitution
to the City's Program.' 3' However, Justice Mosk extended his discussion
further and suggested methods by which the City's Program could be modified
to comply with article I, section 31 to serve as a model for future programs that
32
may be challenged under the same provision.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1087. The court noted, however, that in oral arguments counsel for the City conceded that
the Program was not constitutionally required or obligatory under federal law. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)).
125. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (quoting Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
31-32(1971)). See also North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swam, 402 U.S. 43,46 (1971) (holding statute
enacted to prohibit any student to be assigned or bussed to attend school on account of race or to create a
racial balance or ratio was unconstitutional, since the prohibition conflicted with constitutional duty of
school authorities to disestablish racially segregated, dual school systems); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 813 F. 2d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that state or its political
subdivision has constitutional duty "to ascertain whether it is denying its citizens equal protection of the
laws, and if so, to take corrective steps").
126. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1088.
127. Id. at 1088.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1518 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
131. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1089 (Mosk, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 1091 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennard also concurred in the judgment, but not the majority's
opinion.1 33 Justice Kennard argued that the best method to interpret article I,
section 31 was through the plain meaning of the statute and a review of the
ballot materials. 34 Kennard stressed that the majority could have reached the
same decision by interpreting the statute in its natural sense, without
"discuss[ing] potentially divisive matters, such as the history of judicial
construction of federal constitutional equal protection and statutory civil rights
provisions as applied to racial distinctions.' 3 5
Chief Justice George's concurrence and dissent agreed with the other
Justices that the City's Program violated article I, section 31. 136 However,
George's opinion asserted that the majority failed in its task to simply
"interpret and apply the initiative's language so as to effectuate the electorate's
intent."' 3'
George reasoned that the majority departed from its role by
applying and interpreting other statutes, such as the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII, rather than interpreting article I, section 31. 13' The correct
analysis should have been to look at Proposition 209's contemporary history,
the voters' intent and the specifics of the Program to determine whether the
Program constituted a violation of article I, section 31.139
CONCLUSION
On its face, the City of San Jose's Program was consistent with the
purpose of article I, section 31 because its purpose was to end discrimination
in government contracting. 140 However, the means employed by the City to
remedy this discrimination directly violated the constitutional provision
because they encouraged preferential treatment to a group or individual based
on race or sex.'41 In effect, article I, section 31 of the California Constitution,
and other provisions like it in other states, prohibit governments from using
affirmative actions plans to eliminate discrimination. 42
Article I, section 31 promotes absolute equality by proscribing any
discrimination based on race. It seeks to ensure that all persons seeking
employment or an education from the government have the same opportunity.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

ld. at 1092 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1092 (George, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 1093 (George, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1095 (George, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 72 Cal. App. 4th 600, 608 (1999).
Id. at620.
ld. at 608.
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However, article I, section 31 leaves no recourse for a government to remedy
past discrimination or to ensure that no discrimination exists. In Hi-Voltage,
the City of San Jose attempted to remedy discrimination in the hiring of
subcontractors by prime contractors hired by the City. By ruling that the
City's Program to end such discrimination was unconstitutional, the court left
the City with no means to ensure that prime contractors are not discriminating.
While Justice Mosk's concurrence gave an example of a program that would
be constitutional, the practical effect of such a program is doubtful. In the end,
the proposed program, and certainly any other constitutional program, would
rely on the employer's conscience not to discriminate.
The effects of Proposition 209 have also been felt by the California
educational system. After Proposition 209 was adopted, African-American
and Hispanic admissions fell dramatically at the University of California at
Berkeley.1 3 For instance, in 1998, African-American admissions were down
by 56 percent from 1997.'" By 1999, the eight largest undergraduate
campuses of the University of California had returned to pre-Proposition 209
numbers, mainly due to the rise in admissions at less competitive California
universities, such as University of California at Davis, Santa Cruz and
Riverside. 4 5 Some supporters of Proposition 209 point to data that reveal that
where there used to exist a large difference between black and white students'
grades, before the implementation of Proposition 209, there is now no
substantial difference in the grades of whites and minorities. 4 6 Such
supporters assert that finally,
students are being admitted based on their ability,
47
rather than their race.'
These results have not come without a cost. African-American, Hispanic
and Native American students admitted to prestigious schools such as
Berkeley recognize that their numbers have dwindle, and are hesitant to attend
a university where there are so few students of their race. 48 Graduate schools
in California are also experiencing dwindling numbers of minority students
attending their schools. For instance, the University of California Law School
admissions went from a 1994 first-year class that included 46 AfricanAmericans and 57 Hispanics to a 1999 first-year class with two AfricanAmericans and 17 Hispanics.4 9 In addition, the University of California is
143. Michelle Locke, CaliforniaLt. Governor Seeks to Repair DamagedDiversity, BLACK ISSUES IN
HIGHER ED., Apr. 13, 2000, at 14.
144. Id.
145. Gail Heriot, EqualProtection Works; The End of RacialPreferences in CaliforniaHas Been an
UnheraldedSuccess, THE WEEKLy STANDARD, Apr. 17, 2000, at 19.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Kevin Peraino, Berkeley's New Colors, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 61.
149. John Nichols, The Beat, THE NATION, Apr. 3,2000, at 8.
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spending $150 million-twice the amount spent before the amendment-in the
form of outreach programs that are designed to increase the amount of
underrepresented minority students.' 5
The California Supreme Court's ruling on San Jose's outreach program
will undoubtedly mean that the University of California will also have to
tighten its outreach programs, which use some forms of targeted outreach and
recruitment.'
The court's ruling will undoubtedly affect other government
programs in California that target underrepresented minorities, leaving a bleak
52
future for any type of outreach program.
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